Look up a bank
Type any FDIC-insured bank's name to see six figures from its latest quarterly filing. The first is the Texas Ratio, which compares the loans a bank is having trouble collecting against the money it holds to cover those losses. It measures loan quality and nothing else — the other five are the things it cannot see.
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These are the figures for this banking charter alone. Large groups run several charters, so this may not be the entity holding your account. Why that matters
Texas Ratio
Non-performing assets divided by tangible equity capital plus loan loss reserves. How to read it
No ratio available for this institution.
Its most recent FDIC filing does not report every figure this calculation needs — commonly a US branch of a foreign bank, which files a different schedule. That is not a signal about the bank's health, only that the data is incomplete.
This bank has no measurable cushion.
Its filing is complete, but tangible equity and loan loss reserves together come to zero or less — so there is nothing to divide problem assets by and the ratio cannot be formed. This is the opposite of missing data. Any positive ratio on this site describes a bank with some cushion left; this one does not.
Most often it means intangible assets such as goodwill exceed the bank's equity, leaving tangible equity negative. Check the figures below and at the FDIC before drawing conclusions.
No rating given for this bank — the ratio above is being driven by loans that are still being paid on.
of what this calculation counts as problem assets is 90+ days past due but still accruing interest. A bank only keeps accruing interest when it expects to be repaid — the usual reason is a government guarantee on FHA or VA mortgages, which large servicers hold in volume and which carry almost no loss content. Counting that as distress overstates it, often by a wide margin.
Both figures are shown because the headline number is the standard Texas Ratio and will reconcile with other sources. How this check works
A high ratio means problem assets are large relative to the capital held against them. It is one indicator among many, not a prediction that this bank will fail. Only the 100% mark is a recognized threshold; the band names are our own.
Last quarters
Problem Assets
Safety Cushion
What this means for you
Your deposits are insured to $250,000
Per depositor, per bank, per ownership category — and joint, business and retirement accounts are counted separately, so most households are covered well past $250,000 in total. Check your own coverage with FDIC EDIE
This number is not a reason to move money
It is one backward-looking credit measure from a quarterly filing. Banks carry elevated ratios for years and recover, and the three big 2023 failures all scored under 3% weeks before they were seized. If your balance is within the insured limits, a ratio on this page changes nothing about your money.
When it is worth a closer look
If you hold uninsured balances, or you are a business banking above the limits. The Texas Ratio cannot tell you any of that — but the five measures below can: this bank's uninsured deposit share, its unrealized securities losses, its capital ratios against the regulators' own thresholds, where its funding comes from and whether it is leaving.
Five measures the Texas Ratio cannot see
Silicon Valley Bank, Signature and First Republic all scored under 3% on the ratio above weeks before they were seized. These are the figures that were moving instead, taken from the same Call Report. How each is calculated
Uninsured deposits
sits above the $250,000 insurance limit, against estimated as insured. Money above the limit is the money that leaves first, which is why this figure decides how fast a run can move rather than whether one starts.
A further sits in foreign offices, which carry no FDIC insurance at all and are not counted in the percentage above.
No regulator publishes a threshold for this, so the only useful comparison is the rest of the industry. Across the banks reporting it for , the median was and the industry as a whole — the gap between the two is the largest banks, which hold most of the uninsured money. Silicon Valley Bank's final filing measured 93.8% on exactly this basis.
Both figures are the bank's own estimates, reported on Call Report Schedule RC-O, and both cover deposits in domestic offices plus insured branches in US territories — the same population, so the share cannot exceed 100%. Deposits in foreign offices are in neither, and are shown separately above where they are material.
This bank's filing does not report the deposit split this needs. That says nothing about its deposits — only that the figure is not on file.
Unrealized securities losses
Carried at fair value, so this mark is already inside the equity figure above.
Carried at amortized cost, so this mark appears nowhere on the balance sheet or in the ratio above. This bank classifies no securities as held to maturity, so it carries no unrecognized mark of this kind.
Marking the held-to-maturity book to market would move tangible equity by . That is more than this bank has. Silicon Valley Bank's last filing showed the same thing: a $15.16bn unrealized loss against $15.17bn of tangible equity.
No regulator publishes a threshold for this either, and an unrealized loss only becomes a real one if the bonds have to be sold — which is what a deposit outflow forces. Most banks also elect to exclude the available-for-sale mark from regulatory capital, so neither figure here is inside the capital ratios below.
This bank's filing does not report securities at both cost and fair value, so no mark can be taken.
Regulatory capital
The one measure on this page whose thresholds we did not choose. These are the Prompt Corrective Action categories at 12 CFR 324.403.
This bank has elected the Community Bank Leverage Ratio framework (12 CFR 324.12), so it files no risk-weighted ratios at all. That is a lawful choice of rulebook available to smaller banks, not a gap in its filing — and above 9% it is deemed well capitalized without them.
Its ratio is below the 9% line but above 8%. Under 12 CFR 324.12(a)(5) a bank there keeps the framework and stays deemed well capitalized for up to two consecutive quarters. Below 8% it would have to return to the full risk-weighted rules.
Below on ( against ) .
This is a reading of the published thresholds, not a supervisory determination. A bank's actual PCA category can also be lowered by a written capital directive or an unsatisfactory examination rating, neither of which is public — so a bank shown here as well capitalized may in fact have been placed a category lower. All three banks that failed in the March 2023 run were well capitalized on this test on their final filings.
Funding mix and deposit flows
- Deposits, quarter on quarter
- Brokered deposits
- Borrowings and repo
- Brokered, against assets
Deposits are . A fall is not automatically bad — banks shed expensive brokered money on purpose — but it is the number that moved fastest at every bank that failed in 2023. First Republic's last filing showed deposits down 40.8% in a single quarter.
Brokered deposits are above 10% of assets, the point at which the FDIC's deposit insurance assessment applies a brokered deposit adjustment (12 CFR 327.16(e)).
Brokered money is placed by a third party chasing rate, so it leaves when the rate does. Under 12 CFR 337.6 a bank that is not well capitalized cannot accept it without a waiver — which makes this funding line and the capital category above load-bearing on each other.
Concentration
Read against the two screening criteria in the December 2006 Interagency Guidance on Concentrations in Commercial Real Estate Lending (FDIC FIL-104-2006).
Criterion met. Criterion not met. Above the level, but the 36-month growth leg cannot be measured — this bank has no filing on record from that far back. Portfolio over 36 months, against a test.
Meeting a criterion means the guidance says a bank may be identified for further supervisory analysis — and the guidance is explicit that it is a screening test, not a limit and not a finding of unsafe practice. Signature Bank sat at exactly 300% on its final filing.
Loan book by category
As a share of gross loans. These are the categories the FDIC breaks out, not a complete split of the book, so they do not add to 100%.
The FDIC files this bank under in its own asset concentration hierarchy.
Commercial real estate here means construction and land development, multifamily, and non-owner-occupied commercial property. Owner-occupied property is excluded, as the guidance excludes it — repayment there depends on the occupying business rather than on the property market. The guidance also counts loans that finance commercial real estate without being secured by it, and that balance is not on this endpoint, so the figure above is a floor: this bank's true concentration can only be higher.
Check these figures at the source
Every number above is calculated from 's own Call Report, filed with the FDIC. We add nothing to it and hold no data of our own — so if our arithmetic and the FDIC's filing disagree, the filing is right.
bankfailures.fyi is not affiliated with the FDIC, is not a credit rating agency, and its output is not a rating or a prediction of failure. If you think a figure here is wrong, tell us.
Couldn't reach the FDIC data service
This is a connection problem on our side or theirs — it says nothing about the bank.
No filings on record for this institution
The FDIC has no financial reports for this certificate number. Newly chartered banks and some trust-only institutions don't file the schedules this calculation uses.